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Trust building behaviour within the Balinese fresh produce industry1. 
 




Regression analysis confirms that relational satisfaction communication and the 
availability of alternatives have a significant positive relationship on the development of 
trust between vegetable farmers and traders in Bali. While no relationship between 
power/dependence and a strong personal relationship was found to influence trust, the 
making of relational investments by traders had a significant negative relationship on 




In Indonesia, the number of tourist arrivals has increased from 3,950,000 in 1994 to 
exceed 5,034,000 in 1994 (Hutabarat 1998; Luthfie et al 1995). As the main tourist 
destination in Indonesia, the number of tourist arrivals in Bali has increased from 
436,000 in 1989 to more than 1,110,000 in 1996 (Diparda Tingkat I Bali 1995).  
 
The marked increase in tourist numbers has substantially increased the demand for fresh 
food such as meat, fish, fruit and vegetables. Food is the third most important item of 
tourist expenditure in Bali, with most tourists spending 21% of their total expenditure 
on food (Erawan 1994). For the hotels, Antara and Susrusa (1991) estimate the demand 
for fresh vegetables to exceed 200 tonnes per month.    
 
Institutions catering to the tourists buy most of their produce locally. However, there is 
a perception that the high class hotels may purchase greater quantities of produce from 
external sources (Bachmann 1988). This is believed to be because local farmers are 
unable to meet the needs of these institutional buyers who demand continuity of supply, 
consistent quality and other value-added services.  
 
In most developing countries, and Indonesia is no exception, local farmers often find it 
difficult to satisfy the customers requirements, due to seasonal production, small land 
holdings, traditional cultivation methods, capital constraints and the lack of knowledge 
(Aksoy and Kaynak 1993).  
 
In Indonesia, most farms vary in size from 0.2 ha to less than 5 ha (Soerojo et al 1991). 
In Bali, over 55% of farmers have landholdings less than 1 ha, most of who cultivate 
vegetable crops  (Departemen Pertanian Propinsi Bali 1997). Vegetables are harvested 
from two major growing districts; Baturiti and Kintamani. From these two production 
areas, vegetables are sold to institutional buyers and consumers in the metropolitan 
centre (Denpasar) by collector agents and wholesalers. 
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According to Menegay et al (1993), there are two types of traders within the marketing 
system for fresh vegetables in Indonesia; (1) the tengkulak who predominate in the 
vegetable production areas; and, (2) the grosirs who distribute the vegetables within the 
major metropolitan areas. The larger tengkulak generally have a network of trusted 
farmers with whom they have regular input or cash support arrangements. Invariably, 
they also maintain a guarantee to purchase the crop at harvest.    
 
Produce is sold to the tengkulak either via the tebasan system, where the price is 
negotiated before harvest, or the produce is delivered to the roadside immediately after 
harvest. In either case, farmers seldom bear the costs of transportation, grading or 
packing. Furthermore, since payments are invariably in cash, there is less chance of the 
farmer being cheated by unknown or unfamiliar traders. While farmers selling produce 
to the tengkulak often have well established personal relationships, the tengkulak 
generally purchase only small quantities and are reknown as being tough bargainers 
(Koster and Basuki 1991). 
 
For the grosirs, Menegay et al (1993) describe three kinds; (1) the specialist grosirs who 
purchase only one kind of vegetable in large quantities from the major production areas; 
(2) semi-specialist grosirs who purchase two-three kind of vegetables in generally 
smaller quantities and (3) the diversified grosirs who buy several kinds of vegetables in 
moderate quantities.  
 
While farmers selling directly to the grosirs are able to sell larger volumes and often 
negotiate a higher price, the grosirs often have strict quality criteria. Furthermore, many 
do not pay immediately for the produce they purchase and unlike the tengkulak, many 
are irregular buyers. Consequently, unless the grosir is well known to the farmer, there 




For any potential exchange, trust will be critical if two situational factors are present; 
risk and incomplete buyer information  (Swan and Nolan 1985). Since most transactions 
present some degree of risk and uncertainty to the potential buyer, without some degree 
of trust, the perceived risk may be too great for the transaction to occur.  
 
Trust provides a means of coping with risk and uncertainty in exchange relationships 
(Lane 2000). Risk arises because trusting behaviour potentially exposes one party to the 
presumed opportunistic behaviour of their exchange partner. In transaction cost 
economics (Williamson 1985), an exchange partner copes with the risk of opportunism 
by employing control mechanisms and by making opportunism costly. However, the 
existence of trust between exchange partners enables the transaction to occur without 
the rigidity and expense of hierarchical organisation, while, at the same time, 
minimising risk from opportunistic behaviour (Furlong 1996). Trust reduces transaction 
costs by enforcing honest behaviour.    
 
Trust focuses on the belief or the expectation that the vulnerability arising from the 
acceptance of risk will not be taken advantage of by an exchange partner (Lane 2000). 
Hence, Anderson and Narus (1990) define trust as the belief that an exchange partner 
will perform actions that will result in positive outcomes for the firm and will not take 
unexpected actions that may result in negative outcomes. Moorman, Deshpande and 
Zaltman (1993) define trust as the willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom 
one has confidence.  
 
While both of these definitions view trust as a behavioural intention that reflects 
reliance on the other partner, both definitions, in part, capture quite different aspects of 
the construct. Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman (1993) describe trust as a belief, a 
sentiment or an expectation about an exchange partner that results from the partner’s 
expertise, reliability and intentionality. This component of trust, which Ganesan (1994) 
describes as credibility, is based on the extent to which the buyer believes that the 
supplier has the necessary expertise to perform the activity effectively and reliably.  
 
However, trust also relates to the focal firm’s intention to rely on their exchange partner. 
Ganesan (1994) describes this component as benevolence, because it is based on the 
extent to which the focal firm believes that its partner has intentions and motives 
beneficial to it. A benevolent partner will subordinate immediate self-interest for the 
long-term benefit of both parties and will not take actions that may have a negative 
impact on the firm (Geyskens et al 1998).  
 
Plank, Reid and Pullins (1999) contest that trust can be defined as a global belief on the 
part of the buyer that a salesperson, product or company, will fulfil their obligations as 
understood by the buyer. As such, trust is not unidimensional, but rather, comprised of 
three individual components; salesperson trust, product trust and company trust. 
 
Anderson and Narus (1990) and Doney and Cannon (1997) find it necessary to 
differentiate between trust in an individual and trust in an organisation. Heide (1994) 
considers inter-organisational trust to be a governance mechanism that mitigates 
opportunism in exchange transactions characterised by uncertainty and dependence 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Trust reduces the need for structural mechanisms of control 
(Achrol 1997) and firms learn to become more interdependent (Kumar 1997). When 
trust exists, buyers and suppliers believe that long-term idiosyncratic investments can be 
made with limited risk because both parties will refrain from using their power to 
renege on contracts or to use a change in circumstances to obtain profits in their own 
favour (Ganesan 1994; Doney and Cannon 1997; Geyskens et al 1998). Trust increases 
the partners tolerance for each others behaviour, facilitating the informal resolution of 
conflict, which in turn, allows the partners to better adapt to the needs and capabilities 
of the counterpart firm (Hakansson and Sharma 1996). 
 
A buyer’s trust in their supplier reduces the perception of risk associated with 
opportunistic behaviour, it increases the buyer’s confidence that short-term inequities 
will be resolved over time and it reduces the transaction costs in an exchange 
relationship (Ganesan 1994). Trust is the critical determinant of many factors related to 
performance including the more open exchange of relevant ideas and emotions; greater 
clarification of goals and problems; more extensive search for alternative courses of 
action; greater satisfaction with efforts; and, greater motivation to implement decisions 
(Achrol 1997). Buyers who trust their suppliers are less likely to use alternative sources 
of supply and are more likely to accept any short-term inequities that may arise in the 
exchange relationship (Kumar 1996). 
 




According to the disconfirmation of expectations model, customer satisfaction is the 
result of a comparison between a partner’s performance and the focal firm’s 
expectations (Oliver 1980). Whenever performance exceeds expectations, satisfaction 
will increase. Conversely, whenever performance falls below expectations, customers 
will become dissatisfied.  
 
Between channel members, satisfaction has been defined as a positive affective state 
resulting from an appraisal of all aspects of a firm’s working relationship with another 
(Frazier et al 1989). Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar (1999) propose that satisfaction 
should capture both the economic and non-economic (psychosocial) aspects of the 
exchange.  
 
Economic satisfaction is defined as the channel member’s positive affective response to 
the economic rewards that flow from the relationship (Geyskens et al 1999). An 
economically satisfied channel member considers the relationship a success when it is 
satisfied with the effectiveness and productivity of the relationship with its partner and 
the resulting positive financial outcomes. Channel members that are highly satisfied 
with the economic rewards that flow from their relationship generally perceive their 
partner as being more trustworthy. Furthermore, Mackenzie and Hardy (1996) propose 
that as satisfaction increases so also will trust. 
 
H1: The greater the extent to which the preferred trader is able to satisfy the 
farmer, the greater the farmer’s trust in their preferred trader. 
 
However, satisfaction with the exchange also affects channel members moral and their 
incentive to participate in collaborative activities (Geyskens et al 1999). Both Frazier 
(1983) and Anderson and Narus (1990) suggest that satisfaction with past outcomes 
indicates equity in the exchange. Equity generally refers to the fairness or rightness of 
something in comparison to others (Halstead 1999). Equitable outcomes provide 
confidence that neither party has been taken advantage of in the relationship and that 
both parties are concerned about their mutual welfare (Ganesan 1994).  
 
Conflict is one of the few constructs that is considered to have a direct negative effect 
on satisfaction (Frazier et al 1989). Firms that are able to lower the overall level of 
conflict in their relationship experience greater satisfaction (Anderson and Narus 1990). 
Conflict in channel relationships most often occurs over economic issues (Geyskens et 
al 1999). Channel members that are satisfied with the economic rewards that flow from 
their relationship generally perceive their partner as advancing their goal attainment as 
opposed to impeding or preventing it. Satisfactory conflict resolution will increase 
mutual trust and reinforce each members commitment and confidence that mutually 
satisfying outcomes will continue to be obtained (Thorelli 1986)  
However, not all conflict is negative, nor does a relationship mean that all conflict has 
been resolved (Hakansson and Snehota 1995). A small amount of conflict may prove 
necessary to keep the relationship between two firms healthy. Occasional conflict can 
reduce the inertia in a business relationship, reshaping existing routines into new, 
potentially more effective solutions (Tikkanen et al 2000).  
 
Nevertheless, what is more significant is the manner in which the conflict is resolved. 
Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar (1999) suggest that the most pervasive channel 
construct known to influence satisfaction is the use of power. Satisfaction increases 
when non-coercive sources of power are employed (Frazier 1983). Non-coercive 
influence strategies include information exchange and the discussion of business 
strategies and requests (Frazier and Summers 1986).  
 
Communication and information exchange 
 
Communication has been described as the glue that holds together a channel of 
distribution (Mohr and Nevin 1990). Communication in marketing channels serves as 
the process by which persuasive information is transmitted (Frazier and Summers 
1984), participative decision-making is fostered, programs are coordinated (Anderson 
and Narus 1990), power is exercised (Gaski 1984) and commitment and loyalty are 
encouraged (Anderson and Weitz 1992). Communication enables information to be 
exchanged that may reduce certain types of risk perceived by either one of the parties to 
the transaction (Cunningham and Turnbull 1982; McQuiston 1989).  
 
The more information a party has and feels they can obtain, the more likely they will be 
to trust their exchange partner (Moore 1999). Trust develops from the constant and 
detailed exchange of information that reduces performance ambiguity (Han et al 1993). 
 
In the context of the fresh fruit and vegetable industry, buyers and sellers want to know 
the extent to which their exchange partner has been buying or selling from others and 
whether their partner has been reporting the correct prices (Lyon 2000). 
 
H2: The more market information the preferred trader provides to the farmer, 
the more the farmer’s trust in their preferred market agent will increase.  
 
Tomkins (2001) defines trust as the adoption of a belief by one party in an exchange 
relationship that the other party will not act against their interests, where this belief is 
held without undue doubt or suspicion in the absence of detailed information about the 
actions of the other party. Trust implies adopting such a belief without full information.  
 
However, trust building is a dynamic process dependent upon information. In the early 
stages of a relationship, commitments are usually less extensive and there will be little 
need for trust and information (Wilson 1995). However, as the relationship matures, 
there will be a positive association between trust and information, for trust cannot 
increase without information. Meaningful communication between firms in a working 
relationship is therefore a necessary antecedent of trust (Anderson and Narus 1990). 
Personal relationships 
 
Interpersonal trust in business-to-business relationships is rarely offered spontaneously; 
rather, it results from an extended period of experience with an exchange partner 
(Dwyer et al 1987; Lane 2000). During this time, knowledge about the exchange partner 
is accumulated, either through direct contact, or indirectly through reliable third parties. 
 
Interpersonal trust between individuals is based on familiarity, developed either from 
previous interactions or derived from the membership of similar social groups. Zucker 
(1986) describes how characteristics-based trust rests on social similarities that assume 
cultural congruence because both parties belong to the same social group or community. 
They may share a common religion, ethnic status, or family background. Fukuyama 
(1995) describes how trust evolves in relationships where common values and norms, 
often based on kinship, familiarity and common interests and backgrounds predominate.  
In transitional economies, Fafchamps (1996) describes how in the absence of any 
effective mechanism by which information about bad payers can be widely shared, 
firms must carefully screen potential exchange partners. However, the costs of this 
screening process add appreciably to the costs of the transaction and may significantly 
reduce the firm’s reach. To reduce screening costs, firms may simply infer things about 
one another from easily observed characteristics including race, sex or ethnicity.  
 
When contracts cannot be enforced, firms build up personalised trust relationships. 
Moore (1999) describes how trust is developed on the basis of personal relationships 
within both narrow and specific social and economic networks. An evaluation of a 
person’s trustworthiness may be based upon the memberships that each share in the 
same clan, the same village, ethnic group or social group, or upon the membership that 
only one party holds of a specific group, where the process of acquiring and maintaining 
membership of that group involves some rigorous evaluation of personal character. In 
Ghana, Lyon (2000) describes how many business relationships are referred to in terms 
of personal friendships. These friendship ties mean that the party providing the goods 
has greater confidence that the exchange partner will repay the money because of moral 
obligations to reciprocate. Long-term friends are perceived as being more reliable. 
Granovetter (1985) concludes how trust is embedded in particular social relations and 
the obligations inherent within them.  
 
Anderson and Narus (1990) seek to differentiate between trust as a construct in inter 
personal relationships and trust within working relationships. In interpersonal relations, 
participants expose themselves and their resources to potential loss, whereas in inter 
organisational relations it is the firm that potentially incurs the loss. In small family 
farms, since it is seldom possible to separate farm business activities from household 
activities, interpersonal trust is anticipated to assume greater importance.   
 
H3: The more close the personal friendship that the farmer’s most preferred 
trader is able to maintain with the farmer, the greater the farmer’s trust in their 
preferred trader. 
The making of relationship-specific investments 
 
If a firm wishes to improve its relationship with another, then in all probability, the firm 
will need to commit various resources to the relationship, whether expressed in terms of 
managerial or sales force time, product or service development, process, financial or 
administrative adaptations (Ford et al 1996). Any resource committed above and 
beyond that required to execute the current exchange transaction can be regarded as an 
investment (Campbell and Wilson 1996). 
 
An investment is the process in which resources are committed in order to create, build 
or acquire resources that may be used in the future (Easton and Araujo 1994). Through 
interacting with other firms and committing resources to specific relationships, firms 
have the opportunity to use relationships as a resource for the creation of other 
resources, product adaptations and innovations, process improvements, or to provide 
access to third parties (Hakansson and Snehota 1995). 
 
Adaptations are a significant feature in the dynamics of business relationships. One or 
both parties may make adaptations to bring about an initial fit between their needs and 
their capabilities, but adaptations may also be necessary in an on-going relationship as 
the parties are exposed to changing business conditions (Hallen et al 1991). The better 
adapted to each other the firms become, the more efficient coordination becomes, thus 
paving the way for more and more adaptations.  
 
Inter-firm adaptations imply considerable investments by one or both firms. Since these 
investments are seldom transferable to other business relationships, adaptations tend to 
bond buyers and suppliers together in a closer relationship and to create barriers to entry 
for potential competitors (Wilson 1995). Inter-firm adaptations build trust by indicating 
one partner’s willingness to accommodate the needs of the other (Athaide et al 1996).  
 
Firms adjust products and processes to their partner’s requirements, subject to the 
various constraints imposed by technology and economics (Easton 1992). Hakansson 
and Lundgren (1995) see technological innovation as being an interactive process, 
largely dependent on the exchange of technical information between individuals, 
organisations and institutions.  
 
Feder, Just and Zilberman (1985) indicate that a farmer’s technological choices are 
based primarily upon their exposure to information regarding the new technology. After 
each growing period, the actual yields, revenues and profits are realised and this added 
information, as well as the experience accumulated during the period and information 
gained from other farmers, updates the parameters the farmer uses in making the next 
decision. However, output prices are often highly variable and their uncertainty may 
affect the farmer’s technological choices. 
 
Where technological innovations are involved, firms should consider how they can help 
their partner to rationalise their decision making so as to achieve the full benefits from 
the innovation. Education and training includes the broad set of activities that a firm 
undertakes to help its partner get an innovation up and running (Athaide et al 1996). 
Farmers often need to be educated about the potential applications of a new technology 
before they can evaluate its appropriateness. Often this education process revolves 
around managing their expectations, which may require providing tangible evidence of 
product performance. Providing tangible evidence of product performance will not only 
reduce the farmer’s perceived risk of adoption, but also provide an opportunity to gain 
the farmer’s trust by being honest about the product’s performance. 
 
However, many of these investments are limited to a range of business opportunities 
and may be specific to a potential trading partner. The extent to which the firm making 
the investment is exposed to potential loss is dependent upon the asset specificity. Asset 
specificity refers to the ease with which an investment can be redeployed to alternative 
uses or alternative users without incurring a significant loss in value (Easton and Araujo 
1994). Many of these relationship specific investments are not readily re-deployable, or 
at least, have a substantially reduced value in an alternative relationship, thus exposing 
the firm to the possibility of exploitation by an opportunistic trading partner 
(Williamson 1985). 
 
Nevertheless, Williamson (1985) suggests that investments stabilise relationships by 
altering the firm’s incentive structure. By making relationship specific investments, the 
firm creates an incentive to maintain the relationship. Engaging in opportunistic 
behaviour and thereby risking the dissolution of the relationship is contrary to the self-
interest of the channel member, for, if the opportunism is detected and the relationship 
is terminated, the investment may not have generated adequate returns. 
 
Furthermore, the making of such relationship specific investments may also provide a 
powerful signal to the other party. Observing the other party’s pledges causes the 
channel member to be more confident in the other party’s commitment to the 
relationship, because the other party will sustain considerable economic loss if the 
relationship is terminated (Anderson and Weitz 1992). Relationship specific 
investments offer tangible evidence that the supplier can be believed, that it cares for the 
relationship and is willing to make sacrifices (Ganesan 1994). Thus, the making of 
relationship specific investments may provide a strong signal of the channel partner’s 
trustworthiness.  
 
H4:  The greater the extent to which the preferred trader is willing to make 
relationship-specific investments, the more trust the farmer will place in their 




When the outcomes obtained from the relationship are important or highly valued, the 
focal firm is said to be more dependent (Heide and John 1988). The same is also true 
when the magnitude of the exchange is higher (Lohtia and Krapfel 1994). The higher 
the percentage of sales and profits that arise from handling a particular product line and 
the greater the expectations of sales and profits in the future, the greater the focal firm’s 
dependence (Frazier et al 1989). Thus, a firm is considered more dependent upon 
another when the exchange partner provides a larger proportion of its business.  
 
Dependence is also increased when the outcomes obtained from the relationship are 
comparatively higher than or better than the outcomes available from any alternative 
relationship. Firms dealing with the best partner are more dependent because the 
outcomes associated from trading with that partner are better than those available from 
alternative partners (Heide and John 1988). In this respect, Anderson and Narus (1990) 
view dependence as the outcomes given comparison level for alternatives. Dependence 
is a measure that represents the overall quality of the outcomes available to the focal 
firm from the best alternative exchange relationship. Over many transactions, since the 
focal firm observes that the best available exchange partner repeatedly follows through 
with its promises, they posit a positive relationship between dependence and trust.    
 
However, it is the firm’s perception of its dependence relative to its partner that is of 
most interest in channel relationships. Relative dependence determines the extent to 
which a firm will have influence over or be influenced by its exchange partner 
(Anderson and Narus 1990). With increasing dependence comes greater vulnerability 
making one firm more susceptible to the power and influence of another. The more 
powerful partner may be in a position to create more favourable terms of trade for itself 
(Heide and John 1988; Frazier et al 1989; Lohtia and Krapfel 1994). 
 
Dependence therefore refers to the firm’s need to maintain the channel relationship in 
order to achieve its desired goals (Frazier et al 1989). Dependence can be regarded as 
the price the focal firm has to pay for the benefits that it obtains from its relationships 
with others (Easton 1992). As such, dependence is partly a matter of choice and partly a 
matter of circumstances.   
 
The manner in which power is distributed in the relationship will dictate the way in 
which the relationship both operates and develops. The manner in which the more 
powerful partner chooses to use its power will have a significant impact on the 
relationship. If the more powerful firm is perceived to be using its power to achieve 
collective goals and does not impede the other in attaining its desired rewards, a high 
level of goal compatibility will exist. Conversely, if the firm is perceived to frequently 
pressure the other into taking actions that are against its own interests, conflict will 
inevitably result and trust will decline (Frazier and Summers 1986). Partners will resist 
further influence attempts and try to enhance their power at the expense of the other. 
Trust is reinforced by a problem solving approach rather than those orientated towards 
control (Achrol 1997).  
 
H5: The more power the preferred trader exercises, the more the farmer’s trust 
in their preferred trader will decline 
 
Availability of alternatives 
 
Even when a dependent party does not trust its partner, it may maintain the relationship 
simply because of the benefits it derives (Andaleeb 1996). In such circumstances, 
dependence often arises because of the difficulty firms experience in finding alternative 
exchange partners; the more difficult it is to replace the channel partner, the more the 
focal firm is dependent on its partner (Heide and John 1988). The investment the firm 
needs to put into developing a new relationship in terms of time, effort and money, as 
well as the perceived costs of switching to an alternative exchange relationship can also 
contribute to its dependence on another firm (Frazier 1983).  
 
While exploiting a powerful position will make it difficult for the firm to establish trust 
(McCutcheon and Stuart 2000), agents are less likely to behave in a detrimental manner 
when they are aware of the ability of the focal firm to readily find an alternative partner. 
The ease with which buyers can switch to alternative sources of supply gives them the 
ability to punish untrustworthy suppliers by readily discontinuing their relationship 
(Cannon and Perreault 1999).  
 
H6: As the number of alternative traders increases, the more the farmer’s trust 




Midway through 2001, 200 vegetable farmers in Bali (Indonesia) were asked to respond 
to a comprehensive questionnaire that sought to investigate the nature of the farmer’s 
relationship with their most preferred trader. 
 
Equal numbers of farmers (100) were selected from the two major vegetable growing 
areas of Bedugul and Kitamani (Departemen Pertanian Propinsi Bali 1997). In the 
absence of any reliable list of farmers, contact names and addresses of potential 
respondents were provided by the head man of each village selected for the survey. The 
only criteria for selection was that the respondent was a full-time vegetable farmer.   
 
Developed from the extent literature on buyer-seller relationships, the survey instrument 
was written in English before translation by academic staff at Universitas Udayana to 
Bahasa Indonesia. Interviews were conducted in the farmer’s home by two research 
assistants from Universitas Udayana.  
 
Farmers were first asked to respond to a number of open-ended questions about the 
nature of their farming enterprise and the means by which they disposed of their crops. 
Farmers were then asked to respond to a number of questions that sought to describe the 
criteria they used in their decision to select a particular trader and the nature of their 
relationship with their most preferred trader. Information was sought on the farmer’s 
satisfaction with the exchange, trust, power/dependence, communication and the various 
relationship specific investments the preferred trader made to maintain the relationship. 
The various item measures were developed from the literature reported by Anderson 
and Narus (1990), Anderson and Weitz (1992), Athaide, Meyers and Wilemon (1996), 
Doney and Cannon (1997), Ford (1984), Frazier (1983), Frazier, Gill and Kale (1989), 
Heide and John (1988), Ganesan (1994) and Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer (1995). 
 
The various item measures were then analysed using principal component analysis (with 
Kaiser normalisation and varimax rotation). Those items with factor loadings below 0.5 
or with cross-loadings greater than 0.4 were excluded (Nunnally 1978). Further 
clarification of the contribution each item made to the corresponding factor was 
achieved by applying the reliability coefficient (Cronbach 1951). The resultant factors 
were then regressed against the dependent variable (trust) in order to test the hypothesis. 
Trust was assessed by seven item measures derived from Moorman, Deshpande and 
Zaltman (1992) and Doney and Cannon (1997). Principal component analysis produced 
a two factor solution that collectively explained 53% of the variance. However, after 
applying the reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) only the first factor was accepted 
(Table 1).                              
Table 1. The trust dimension. 
 
 Factor score 
 1 2 
I have confidence in my preferred trader 0.877  
I trust my preferred trader 0.869  
I believe my preferred trader has the necessary expertise to 
market the produce I grow* 
0.639  
My preferred trader always keeps their promises*  0.548 0.559 
My preferred trader always considers my best interests*  0710 
My preferred trader is not always sincere* [R]  0.594 
I believe the information provided by my preferred trader*  0.563 
   
Cronbach’s alpha 0.818 0.325 
 




From the farmers responses to the remaining 21 prepared statements, principal 
component analysis produced six factors that collectively explained 69% of the variance 
(Table 2).  
Table 2. Results of principal component analysis. 
 
 Mean SD Factor 
score 
Power/dependence    
I am more dependent upon my preferred trader than 
they are upon me 
3.00 1.82 0.831 
I have no choice other than to adhere to my preferred 
trader’s demands 
2.89 1.76 0.793 
Over time I have become more dependent upon my 
preferred trader 
2.81 1.93 0.790 
My preferred trader has all the power in our 
relationship 
3.63 1.88 0.688 
My preferred trader determines what I grow, when I 
grow plant and when I harvest 
2.61 1.77 0.660 
My preferred trader controls all the information in our 
relationship 
3.04 1.80 0.646 
Cronbach’s alpha   0.859 
 
 
Relational investments    
My preferred trader frequently provides education and 
training programs 
3.22 2.19 0.877 
My preferred trader often suggests that we should aim 
to coordinate production schedules 
3.72 1.97 0.785 
I look to my preferred trader for advice on what crops 
to grow 
3.60 2.10 0.751 
My preferred trader keeps me well informed on 
technical matters 
4.24 1.95 0.639 
Cronbach’s alpha   0.834 
    
Communication    
My preferred trader often advises me of potential 
market demand 
5.46 1.69 0.855 
My preferred trader frequently informs me of product 
quality and service requirements  
5.39 1.69 0.842 
My preferred trader keeps me well informed of prices 
in the market  
5.53 1.59 0.755 
Cronbach’s alpha   0.815 
    
Relational satisfaction    
My preferred trader treats me fairly and equitably 6.03 1.11 0.761 
My preferred trader is quick to handle complaints 5.23 1.56 0.719 
I feel I am adequately rewarded by my most preferred 
trader 
5.79 1.12 0.708 
My preferred trader often meets my expectations 5.51 1.36 0.685 
Cronbach’s alpha   0.740 
    
Personal friendship    
My preferred trader is a close personal friend 4.23 2.05 0.894 
I have a close personal friendship with my preferred 
trader  
4.34 1.76 0.816 
Cronbach’s alpha   0.760 
    
Alternative traders     
I can choose between several traders 5.61 1.47 0.840 
I am free to choose another trader at any time 5.63 1.46 0.748 
Cronbach’s alpha   0.655 
 
  where 1 is “I disagree a lot” and 7 is “I agree a lot”  
 
Factor 1 (power/dependence) captured six items that collectively evaluated the extent to 
which the preferred trader had all the power in the relationship (Frazier, Gill and Kale 
1989) and controlled all the information. While most farmers (62%) cropped fewer than 
0.5 hectares, the majority of farmers indicated that they were neither dependent, nor did 
they have to comply with the traders demands. With only 55% of farmers selling more 
than 80% of their vegetable crop to traders, most farmers had one or more alternative 
market outlets including direct sales to village or adjacent markets, or the option of 
retaining the produce they had grown for self consumption or animal feed. 
 
Factor 2 (relational investments) was a measure of the extent to which traders were 
willing to provide education and training programs, to provide advice (derived from 
Athaide, Meyers and Wilemon 1996) and the extent to which the trader sought to 
coordinate production plans (Ford 1984). Most farmers indicated a somewhat neutral 
approach, suggesting that while some traders readily provided technical support, others 
were much less forthcoming. 
 
Factor 3 (communication) was a measure of the extent to which the preferred trader 
advised the farmer of potential market demand, product and service requirements and 
the prevailing prices in the market (derived from Anderson and Narus 1990, Anderson 
and Weitz 1992 and Athaide, Meyers and Wilemon 1996). Most farmers indicated that 
their preferred traders readily provided market information. 
 
Factor 4 (relational satisfaction) was derived from the farmer’s perceptions of having 
been adequately rewarded and treated fairly and equitably (Frazier 1983). Relational 
satisfaction was enhanced by the speed with which the preferred trader responded to the 
farmer’s complaints (Ford 1984) and the extent to which the trader met the farmer’s 
expectations (Anderson and Narus 1990). Most farmers indicated that they were highly 
satisfied in their relationship with their most preferred trader. Most farmers (60%) 
indicated that they had been transacting with their preferred trader for between one to 
five years, with 99% of farmers indicating that it was their intention to continue to 
transact with their preferred trader.  
 
Factor 5 (personal friendship) captured two items that sought to measure the extent to 
which the farmer’s most preferred trader was a close personal friend (derived from 
Achrol 1997). While most farmer’s indicated that personal friendships were involved in 
their relationship with their most preferred trader, the somewhat neutral position 
adopted by most farmers suggested that a more arms-length business relationship was 
more appropriate in their transactions with traders. 
 
Factor 6 (availability of alternatives) was comprised of two items (derived from Heide 
and John 1988) that sought to evaluate the extent to which farmers could readily choose 
an alternative trading partner. Most farmers indicated that they could readily switch 
between alternative traders should they find it necessary or desirable to do so.  
 
The six principal components were then regressed against the single dependent variable 
(trust) using linear regression (Table 3). 
 
A significant positive relationship between relational satisfaction and trust, the 
availability of alternatives and trust and communication and trust was confirmed. 
However, no relationship between power/dependence and trust or personal friendship 
and trust could be confirmed. Quite contrary to expectations, a significant negative 
relationship between the trader’s willingness to make relational investments and the 
farmer’s trust in their preferred trader was identified. 
 
Table 3. Results of regression analysis 
 
 Beta t Sig. Hypothesis 
Relational satisfaction 0.287 4.736 0.000 Accepted 
Alternatives 0.242 4.005 0.000 Accepted 
Communication 0.182 3.009 0.003 Accepted 
Power/dependence 0.111 1.827 0.069 Rejected 
Personal friendship -0.024 -0.078 -1.294 Rejected 
Relational investments -0.322 -5.320 0.000 Accepted* 
     
Adjusted R2 = 0.274     
Standard error = 0.662     
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
While there is much empirical support for a significant positive relationship between 
relational satisfaction and trust (Mackenzie and Hardy 1996, Geyskens et al 1999), the 
availability of alternatives and trust (Cannon and Perreault 1999) and communication 
and trust (Han et al 1993, Moore 1999), the finding of a significant negative relationship 
between the trader’s willingness to make relational investments and the farmer’s trust in 
that trader was quite unexpected. While the majority of the literature anticipates a 
significant positive relationship between the making of relational investments and trust 
(Ganesan 1994), and there is strong empirical support for this relationship in the fresh 
produce industry in Western Australia (Batt 2002), it would seem that, at least from the 
Balinese farmers perspective, accepting and adopting these relational investments 
provides few tangible benefits. 
 
In the fresh fruit and vegetable industry, farmers are often reluctant to enter into any 
long-term agreements with customers because such contracts inherently exclude farmers 
from transacting in the open market and taking advantage of the inordinately high prices 
that arise from time to time. In the processing industry, where product requirements are 
often quite dissimilar to those required in the fresh market, produce may not be able to 
readily change markets. Furthermore, as corporate ownership of plant varieties becomes 
more common, opting to grow a specific variety under contract may by necessity infer 
that the farmer has only one customer. Not unexpectedly, in such a situation, farmers 
fear exploitation. In such a situation, trust will assume far greater importance, however, 
the extent to which farmers choose to trust or not to trust will be tempered by previous 
interactions.   
 
In Bali, Batt and Parining (2001) conclude that under the current system of marketing, 
where farmers are encouraged to sell their produce ungraded to local collector agents 
and traders, there is no financial incentive for farmers to improve product quality. Since 
the majority of relational incentives made by the traders seek to improve product quality 
or at least to improve the traders capacity to better fulfil their customers needs, it is not 
surprising that the majority of farmers may choose not to adopt these innovations or to 
enter into long-term agreements where farmers believe they are less able to exploit 
opportunities in the market. Lyon (2000) suggests that trust is calculative; actors make 
rational conscious decisions that minimise transaction costs in order to maximise their 
individual gains. If farmers cannot see any tangible benefits arising from the adoption of 
improved technologies, such investments may be perceived as simply an unnecessary 
cost which will, understandably, result in a significant reduction in trust. 
 
There is abundant literature to support the importance of previous interactions in both 
the development and maintenance of trust. Prior experience provides opportunities to 
build credibility and trust (Dwyer et al 1987, Anderson and Narus 1990). Zucker (1986) 
describes how trust is based on first-hand experience; repeated transactions enable the 
exchange partners to better understand each other’s motives and priorities. Luhmann 
(1979) argues that trust involves a learning process that is only complete when the 
person to be trusted has had the opportunity to betray trust. Personal experience is 
therefore the best indicator of the underlying trustworthiness of an exchange partner.  
 
While Bradach and Eccles (1989) describe how trust evolves between exchange 
partners where there are common values and the relationship is embedded in personal 
friendships, no significant relationship between personal friendship and trust could be 
found. Fafchamps (1996) describes how when firms feel uncertain about the reliability 
of a customer, the firm will express an overwhelming desire to conduct business with 
people they already know. However, Fafchamps warns that non-business relationships 
(with relatives, neighbours, church mates) play little role in identifying trustworthy 
clients, and goes as far to suggest that, “selling on credit to relatives and neighbours is 
as good as signing a death warrant for the firm”. Personal relationships often get in the 
way of pressuring customers for non-payment. Consequently, the inability to find a 
significant positive relationship between personal relationships and trust is not entirely 
unexpected.   
 
Clearly, that factor which is most influential in building trust between vegetable farmers 
and traders is relational satisfaction. Farmers are most satisfied when they believe they 
have been treated fairly and equitably, when the farmer’s expectations of what they 
think they should receive have been met and when farmer’s feel adequately rewarded 
for their efforts. Whenever economic outcomes are higher than expected, farmer’s may 
attribute a great deal of credit to their trading partner. In doing so, the farmer’s 
attraction to and trust in their most preferred trader will increase (Geyskens et al 1998). 
Since satisfaction is also inversely related to channel conflict (Frazier 1983), the speed 
with which the trader addresses the farmer’s complaints will lower the overall level of 
conflict in the relationship and have a significant positive impact on trust.  
 
With trust, outcomes can be more reliably predicted which, in turn, makes both 
exchange partners feel more secure in their relationship (Andaleeb 1996).  Conversely, 
when there is little trust between partners, the relationship becomes risky, costly and 
fragile and the outcomes much more uncertain. In order to operate with some degree of 
predictability, firms have to be able to take and place orders, arrange for future 
deliveries and to dissociate payment from the physical delivery of goods and services 
(Fafchamps 1996). Poor performance will have major implications through the system, 
travelling both up-stream and down-stream through the network. Trust reduces 
complexities and discloses possibilities for action that may have otherwise remained 
improbable and unattractive. 
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